Following extensive consultations, the RSK adopted the statement "RSK’s understanding of safety philosophy" at its 460th meeting.

At its 462nd meeting, the RSK adopted the statement on the "Assessment of the coverage of extreme weather conditions by the existing design" and convened the ad hoc working group SAMG (Severe Accident Management Guidelines). The ad hoc working group was requested to prepare a statement. The voting for the 68th meeting of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) was determined.

The statement "Specification of requirements related to the 10-hours self-sufficiency in the event of external man-made hazards (man-made hazard conditions)” (in German) was adopted. The RSK was informed about an incident in the Swedish Forsmark 3 nuclear power plant on 30.05.2013 "manual start of the emergency diesel generators after loss of off-site power supply" and in the Swiss Gösgen nuclear power plant on 30.06.2012 "reactor scram due to false triggering of reactor protection signals" and about the current state regarding fuel assembly deformations in the Philippsburg nuclear power plant, Unit 2. The consultations on the understanding of the safety philosophy were continued.

At the meeting, the newly appointed RSK members were welcomed. The RSK proposed to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) to appoint Mr. Rudolf Wieland as Chairman and Mr. Richard Donderer as Vice Chairman. The RSK was informed by the BMUB on the revision of the WENRA “Safety Reference Levels for existing reactors” and by GRS about the current state of affairs as regards the accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The consultations on the RSK statement “Section-wide unavailabilities due to electrical coupling between redundant sections of the emergency power system of German nuclear power plants” have started.

At its 463rd meeting, the VGB PowerTech e.V. reported to the RSK on the experiences in implementing the RSK recommendation on the robustness of the German nuclear power plants (this recommendation had been prepared by the RSK in connection with the incidents at the Japanese nuclear power plant Fukushima). The RSK visited the Isar 2 nuclear power plant.

The RSK adopted the statement on "The RSK guideline for the implementation of integrated event analyses in comparison with the VGB guideline on the integrated event analysis" (in German). The consultations on the statement on one-or two-phase failure of the main, back-up or emergency power supply connection have been started and are scheduled to be concluded at the next meeting.

The RSK consulted on generic knowledge from occurrences at the Philippsburg nuclear power plant and measures against a loss of know how and motivation in the plants. The Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK) informed the RSK about a draft on the prediction and assessment of source terms with regard to a potential or actual release into the atmosphere during nuclear power plant accidents.

The RSK specified key issues for discussion among the RSK and its committees for 2013, the discussions regarding the understanding of the safety philosophy were continued. The statement on "Pressure and leak tests of components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and outer systems, especially after repairs" (in German) was adopted. GRS concluded its reporting on the results of first calculations regarding possible criticality in the fuel element storage.

After consultation with the RSK, the BMU appointed Mr. Rudolf Wieland as Chairman of the RSK and Mr. Richard Donderer as Vice Chairman of the RSK. GRS presented results of first calculations on the possible criticality in the fuel pool. The statement “Ultraschallanzeigen am Reaktordruckbehälter des belgischen Kernkraftwerks Doel, Block 3” (detection of flaws in the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 3 of Belgium's Doel nuclear power plant - in German) was adopted, and the consultations on the statement "RSK's understanding of safety philosophy" were continued.

The RSK agreed on the revision of the BMU’s request for advice on measures against a loss of know how and motivation. The RSK discussed the drafts of the statements “RSK-Verständnis der Sicherheitsphilosophie” (RSK understanding of the safety philosophy) and “Ultraschallanzeigen am Reaktordruckbehälter des belgischen Kernkraftwerks Doel, Block 3” (detection of flaws in the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 3 of Belgium's Doel nuclear power plant), but did not yet finalise them. The procedure for the further consultation on the RSK statement on grid stability has been specified.